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Abstract—This paper shows that the fuzzy temporal logic can
model figures of thought to describe decision-making behaviors.
In order to exemplify, some economic behaviors observed ex-
perimentally were modeled from problems of choice containing
time, uncertainty and fuzziness. Related to time preference, it is
noted that the subadditive discounting is mandatory in positive
rewards situations and, consequently, results in the magnitude
effect and time effect, where the last has a stronger discounting
for earlier delay periods (as in, one hour, one day), but a weaker
discounting for longer delay periods (for instance, six months, one
year, ten years). In addition, it is possible to explain the preference
reversal (change of preference when two rewards proposed on
different dates are shifted in the time). Related to the Prospect
Theory, it is shown that the risk seeking and the risk aversion
are magnitude dependents, where the risk seeking may disappear
when the values to be lost are very high.
Index Terms—Fuzzy Logic; Temporal Logic; Time Preference;
Prospect Theory; ensemble average; time average
I. INTRODUCTION
FUZZY logic addresses reasoning about vague perceptionsof true or false [1]–[3]. Moreover, it represents very well
our linguistic description about everyday dynamic processes
[4]–[10]. Thus, the introduction of tense operators becomes a
necessity [11]–[15] because they are useful to represent the
temporal indeterminism contained in some propositions [16],
[17]. For example, the hypothesis “The weather is very hot”
has its sense of truth revealed when we say “The weather will
always be very hot”. The quantifier “always” communicates
the belief about hypothesis confirmation in the future.
The task of developing a general theory for decision-making
in a fuzzy environment was started in [18], but a temporal
approach still needs to be discussed. For example, do you
prefer to receive 7 dollars today or to receive it 5 years later?
If you prefer today, then you made a distinction of the same
value at distant points from time, even though you have used
vague reasoning about value changes because we do not access
our equity value in memory to perform calculations.
In decision-making, we do not only evaluate fuzzy goals,
but also the time. The change caused by 7 dollars is strongly
distinguishable between a short time and a distant future. This
suggests the existence of temporal arguments in fuzzy logic,
where “little change in wealth today” is different from “little
change in wealth 5 years later”. The linguistic value “little” is
irrelevant in this problem, but the arguments “today” and “5
years later” are decisive in the judgment.
The proposal here is to connect different fuzzy sets through
time attenuators and intensifiers. Hence, it is possible to simu-
late two figures of thought in hypotheses of dynamic systems:
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meiosis to argue underestimated changes and hyperbole to
argue overestimated changes.
Through meiosis it is possible to formulate a concave
expected change curve because it argues minor changes for
maximizing the sense of truth. By this figure of thought within
the fuzzy temporal logic it is noticeable that the hyperbolic
discounting [19]–[24] and its subadditivity [25], [26], despite
its numerous expected utility theory anomalies [27]–[29], is
an intuitive dynamic evaluation of wealth, where ergodicity is
relevant in the problem [30], [31]. Similarly, concave expected
change curve in lotteries [32] make certain outcomes more
attractive than lotteries with uncertain outcomes.
Hyperbole has an inverse reasoning to meiosis and it
produces a convex expected change curve. Similarly, risky
losses in the Prospect Theory have the same characteristic
in its subjective value function [33]–[35]. Then, it is shown
here that the risk seeking, which is a preference for risky
losses rather than certain losses [36], can be described in
fuzzy environment by an imprecise perception for small losses.
Thus, the indistinguishability between small negative changes
leads to preference for hopes when only these are perfectly
distinguishable. On the other hand, when the losses are high,
the risk seeking disappears and a kind of ruin aversion prevails
[37], where it is better to lose a lot and stay with little than
risk losing all means of survival after the lottery. In addition,
the loss aversion behavior, where people prefer not to lose a
given amount than to win the same amount [35], is interpreted
by a disjunction between gains and losses hypotheses leading
to the conclusion that such behavior is also amount dependent.
In essence, all the behaviors analyzed here are speculation
examples in dynamic systems, where we evaluate hypotheses
and commit to outcomes before they emerge. This paper
shows, by modeling the Time Preference and the Prospect
Theory, that the fuzzy temporal logic allows to construct a
rhetoric for intertemporal and probabilistic choices in fuzzy
environment. The first problem takes us to focus on values and
time and the second focuses on values and probabilities. How-
ever, if the future is uncertain, there is no reason for time and
uncertainty are studied in different matters [38]. In addition,
the feelings about judgments are amount dependents where the
fuzziness can be decisive in some situations. Therefore, time,
uncertainty and fuzziness are concepts that can be properly
studied by the fuzzy temporal logic in order to elaborate the
decision-making rhetoric.
II. THEORETICAL MODEL
This section provides a theoretical framework for the reader
to understand as the figures of thought, meiosis and hyperbole,
can be elaborated in the fuzzy temporal logic. In short, it
is discussed the need of many-valued temporal logic, the
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2existence of different temporal prepositions with similar goals
over time and, finally, it is shown as to perform the rhetor-
ical development to make a judgment between two different
hypotheses about the future.
A. Temporal and many-valued logic
Usually we make decisions about dynamic processes whose
states are unknown in the future. An amusing example can be
found in an Aesop’s fable, where the Grasshopper and the Ant
have different outlooks for an intertemporal decision dilemma
[39]. In short, while the Ant is helping to lay up food for
the winter, the Grasshopper is enjoying the summer without
worrying about the food stock.
The narrative teaches about hard work, collaboration, and
planning by presenting temporal propositions. These proposi-
tions have invariant meaning in time, but sometimes they are
true and sometimes false, yet never simultaneously true and
false [40]. This property can be noted in the statement:
D1 = “We have got plenty of food at present” [39].
Although D1 has constant meaning over time, its logical value
is not constant. According to the fable, this statement is true
in the summer, but it is false in the winter, hence there is a
need to stock food.
If the logical value varies in time according to random
circumstances, such as the weather of the seasons, how can
we make inferences about the future? There seems to be a
natural uncertainty that sets a haze over the vision of what
will happen. For instance, consider the following statements
about the Grasshopper:
D2 = “The Grasshopper stored a lot of food
during the summer”;
D3 = “The Grasshopper stores food for winter”.
According to the fable, we know that the statement D2 is false,
but at the fable end, when the winter came, the Grasshopper
says “It is best to prepare for days of need” [39]. In this way,
the truth value in D3 is ambiguous. We can not say with
certainty that it is false, but we do not know how true it can
be. Thus, we can only propose hypotheses to speculate the
Grasshopper’s behavior.
A hypothesis is a proposition (or a group of propositions)
provisionally anticipated as an explanation of facts, behaviors,
or natural phenomena that must be later verified by deduction
or experience. They should always be spoken or written in the
present tense because they are referring to the research being
conducted. In the scientific method, this is done independently
whether they are true or false and, depending on rigor, no
logical value is attributed to them. However, in everyday
language this rigor does not exist. Hypotheses are guesses that
argue for the decision-making before the facts are verified, so
they have some belief degree about the logical value that is
a contingency sense performing a sound practical judgment
concerning future events, actions or whatever is at stake.
Since there is no rigor in everyday speculations, then
different propositions may arise about the same fact. If they
are analyzed by binary logic, then we may have unneces-
sary redundancy that can lead to contradictions. However,
the redundancy of propositions is not a problem within the
speculation process, what suggests a many-valued temporal
logic.
We can discuss the limitations of a binary temporal logic
by speculating the Grasshopper’s behavior. For example, is
it possible to guarantee that the two hypotheses below are
completely true simultaneously?
Θ = “The Grasshopper stores a lot of food”;
θ = “The Grasshopper stores little food”.
The hypotheses Θ and θ propose changes to different states.
If S0 is the initial state for stored food, the new state after
storing a lot of food M is SΘ = S0 + M . Analogously, the
next state after storing little food is Sθ = S0 +m for m < M .
Representing by Θ(t) the affirmation that Θ is true at the
moment t and considering the same initial state for both, then
by binary logic
Θ(t) 6= θ(t) because SΘ > Sθ.
Therefore, affirming both as true leads to a contradiction
because the same subject can not simultaneously produce two
different results on the same object. However, in a speculation
of the Grasshopper’s behavior, none of the propositions can
be discarded.
Evaluating by fuzzy logic, the linguistic variable “stored
food” has values “a lot of” and “little” in the propositions Θ
and θ. According to Bellman and Zadeh’s model [18], these
linguistic values are the fuzzy constraints for inputs M and
m about the food supply. Meanwhile, the target states Sθ and
SΘ can be the fuzzy goals.
An alternative development, but similar, can be done
through changes, what is in accordance with human psy-
chophysical reality [36]. Thus, in this paper, the goals are
the factors SΘ/S0 = 1 + X and Sθ/S0 = 1 + x, where
X = M/S0 and x = m/S0 are changes. For example,
in [41] the respondents were asked how they would feel
gaining (or losing) a certain amount. It was noted that the
emotional effects gradually increased as the amounts had
grown. Therefore, the intensity of gains and losses are easily
ordered by our perception, x < X .
The non-fuzzy set −1 ≤ x < X for changes can have
the fuzzifier effect to transform it into a fuzzy set. Here, the
general rule for fuzzy goals is simply “the bigger the better”.
This rule can be represented by the membership function µ :
[−1,∞)→ [0, 1), where:
1) µ(−1) = 0 means losing all;
2) if −1 ≤ x < X , then µ(x) < µ(X), i.e., µ(x) is always
growing;
3) lim
x→∞µ(x) = 1 means that the best gain goal (or change)
is undefined.
Figure 1 shows a membership function example that satisfies
the above descriptions. The membership function µ(x) is the
general rule in decision-making because higher gains and
lower losses, generally, cause better well-being. Therefore,
others membership functions will be a composition with the
form µ(f(x)), where f must be in accordance with the
rhetorical figure necessary to make a decision.
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Fig. 1. Membership function example µ(x) = 1 − [1 − αβ(x + 1)] 1α for
α = −1.001 and β = 1.3.
B. Different hypotheses with similar future sentences
The sense of truth that we have about a hypothesis becomes
evident when we express it in the form of future statement.
Given that a future sentence indicates an event occurrence
after the moment of speech, then it can emphasize the fact
realization with an intuitive implicit probability. For example,
consider the following future statements for Θ and θ:
FΘ = “The Grasshopper will sometime store
a lot of food”;
Gθ = “The Grasshopper will always store
little food”.
The statement Gθ expresses certainty with the modifier “al-
ways”, while FΘ expresses uncertainty about the instant
that the action occurs through the modifier “sometime”. In
temporal logic FΘ is equivalent to saying which there is an
instant t in the future where Θ is true, i.e, ∃ t such that
(now < t) ∧ Θ(t). Meanwhile, Gθ affirms that θ is always
true in the future, θ(t) ∀ t > now.
About the certain sense, FΘ is known as the weak operator
because Θ is true only once in the future, while Gθ is known
as the strong operator because it is true in all future periods.
If Θ does not always come true, then we can investigate its
sense of truth through the affirmative:
GFΘ = “The Grasshopper will frequently store
a lot of food”.
Where the quantifier “frequently” better argues for the sense
of truth of Θ because we have undefined repetitions in the
same period in which Gθ is true.
The frequency in which the propositions Θ and θ are
true and the changes proposed by them determine the out-
comes over time. The affirmative GFΘ communicates that
the Grasshopper will frequently produce a strong change in the
stored food stock (change factor 1+X). On the other hand, Gθ
proposes a small change factor, 1 + x, but continuously over
time. So what is the relation between X and x that generates
a similarity of states between the two hypotheses over time?
The relation that constructs this similarity can be obtained by
the time average. Therefore, let us consider τ(t) as the total
time where GFΘ is true and t as the observation time. If Θ
is true with a frequency given by
lim
t→∞
τ(t)
t
= s, (1)
then, the relation between change factors 1 + x = (1 + X)s,
estimated by time average [30], indicates that the sentences
GFΘ and Gθ have similar goals in the long run. This
similarity is denoted in this work by
GFΘ ∼ Gθ. (2)
The sense of truth for the sentence GFΘ is quantified in
the parameter s. It can be a stationary probability when t is
big enough, but we do not have much time to calculate this
probability in practice. In this way, we assume that the sense
of truth is an imprecise suggestion (intuition) for the time
probability. Figure 2 presents some adverbs of frequency that
can suggest the sense of truth in future sentences.
𝐺 always s = 1 
𝐺𝐹 
usually 
s > 1/2 frequently 
often 
sometimes s = 1/2 
occasionally 
s < 1/2 
rarely 
seldom 
hardly ever 
𝐺¬ never s = 0 
 
Fig. 2. Adverbs of frequency that can suggest the sense of truth of GF . The
quantifier “always” indicates certainty, while “never” indicates impossibility.
The axiomatic system of temporal logic proposes that
Gθ ⇒ GNθ, where Nθ stands for θ is true at the next instant.
Therefore, the similarity GFΘ ∼ Gθ can be written by
FΘ ∼ Nθ, (3)
when 1+x ≈ (1+X)s. Thus, the statement “the Grasshopper
will sometime store a lot of food”, which have a change factor
1 +X , is similar to the statement “the Grasshopper will store
little food at the next moment”, which has a change factor
(1 +X)s.
C. Rhetoric: Meiosis and Hyperbole
In general, different hypotheses do not have similar changes
in the future. For this reason, it is required that a rhetorical
development make a judgment between them. In this section,
two figures of thought are presented, meiosis and hyperbole,
which can be used to compare hypotheses with different
changes and senses of truth.
Still using Aesop’s fable, imagine that we want to com-
pare Ant and Grasshopper’s performance with the following
hypotheses:
φ = “The Ant stores little food”;
Θ = “The Grasshopper stores a lot of food”.
4Assume that the Ant produces a change y in its food stock
while the Grasshopper produces a change X . If we think that
the Ant is more diligent in its work than the Grasshopper, i.e.,
the sense of truth for φ is maximum while the sense of truth
for Θ is ambiguous, so we can affirm Nφ and FΘ in order
to develop the following argumentation process:
1) elaborate a proposition θ, similar to Θ, which proposes
a lower outcome, that has a change x (for example, θ =
“The Grasshopper stores little food”);
2) express θ with maximum certainty in the future, Nθ
= “The Grasshopper will store little food at the next
moment”;
3) calculate the relation 1 + x ≈ (1 + X)s to match the
average changes between Nθ and FΘ in order to obtain
the similarity FΘ ∼ Nθ, where X > x and s ∈ [0, 1];
4) finally, judge the affirmations Nφ and Nθ through fuzzy
logic. In this specific problem we have
Nθ or Nφ = max {µ ((1 +X)s − 1) , µ(y)} .
The above argument uses meiosis and the upper part of
Figure 3 summarizes this procedure. In linguistic meiosis, the
meaning of something is reduced to simultaneously increase
something else in its place. In the above mentioned case,
proposing θ means reducing the stored food change by the
Grasshopper. At the same time, this suggests greater certainty
because it makes the process more feasible in the future.
However, it is only a figure of thought to make an easy
comparison because judging two sentences with the same
sense of truth, looking only at the change goals, is much
simpler.
The meiosis for Grasshopper’s case has a membership
composite function given by
µ Grasshopper’s goal = µ ◦ µmeiotic change(X) = µ ((1 +X)s − 1) .
In general, µ Grasshopper’s goal refers to the fuzzy goal “the bigger
the better is the change (1 + X)s − 1 at the next moment”.
Like this, we can evaluate it for decision-making in real time.
FΘ
FΦ
Nθ
Nφ
(1 +X)s︸ ︷︷ ︸
Meiosis
Hyperbole︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1 + y)
1
s
Fig. 3. Diagram representing the meiosis and hyperbole procedure for the
judgment of hypotheses. The blue sentences FΦ and Nθ are the figures of
thought.
On the other hand, there is an inverse process to meiosis
that is called hyperbole. Basically, it exaggerates a change in
the outcome to reduce its sense of truth. In everyday language,
such statements are commonplace, as “the bag weighed a ton”.
In this statement, we realize that the bag is really heavy.
However, is there a bag weighing really a ton? This is just
a figure of speech.
In order to understand how to judge two hypotheses through
a process of hyperbolic argumentation, consider again that we
can make the future statements FΘ and Nφ pass through the
following steps:
1) elaborate a proposition Φ, similar to φ, which proposes
a larger outcome, that has a change Y (for instance, Φ
= “The Ant stores a lot of food”);
2) affirm Φ in the future with the same sense of truth as the
proposition Θ, that is, FΦ = “The Ant will sometime
store a lot of food”;
3) calculate the relation (1 + y)
1
s ≈ 1 + Y to match the
average changes between Nφ and FΦ in order to obtain
the similarity Nφ ∼ FΦ, where Y > y and s ∈ [0, 1];
4) finally, judge the fuzzy changes goals of the affirmative
FΦ and FΘ. In this specific problem we have
FΘ or FΦ = max
{
µ(X), µ
(
(1 + y)
1
s − 1
)}
.
The hyperbole for Ant’s case has a membership composite
function given by
µ Ant’s goal = µ ◦ µhyperbolic change(y) = µ
(
(1 + y)
1
s − 1
)
.
Thus, µ Ant’s goal refers to the fuzzy goal “the bigger the better
is the change (1 + y)
1
s − 1 sometime in the future”.
The bottom part of Figure 3 summarizes hyperbolic argu-
mentation procedure. Note that the arguments by meiosis and
hyperbole lead to the same conclusion. Therefore, they can
be only two ways to solve the same problem. However, in
section IV, where the Prospect Theory is evaluated, there may
be preference for one of the methods according to the frame
in which the hypotheses are inserted.
III. TIME PREFERENCE
Time preference is the valuation placed on receiving a good
on a short date compared with receiving it on a farther date.
A typical situation is choosing to receive a monetary amount
m after a brief period (a day or an hour) or to receive M > m
in a distant time (after some months or years).
The time preference choice is a problem of logic about
the future and in order to model it consider the following
hypotheses:
• Θm = “to receive m” represents the receipt of the amount
m in short period, tm = t0 + δt;
• ΘM = “to receive M” represents the receipt of the
amount M in longer time horizons, tM = t0 + ∆t.
Each proposition has a change factor for the individual’s
wealth. The proposition ΘM has the change factor (1 +
M/W0), while Θm has the change factor (1 + m/W0).
Now, we perform the meiosis procedure for both hypotheses,
reducing the changes and maximizing the sense of truth:
• Nθm = “to receive an amount less than m at the next
moment”. This affirmative proposes a change factor 1 +
xm in the individual’s wealth;
• NθM = “to receive an amount less than M at the next
moment”. Similarly, this affirmative proposes a change
factor 1 + xM .
5The senses of truth for the hypotheses ΘM and Θm are
revealed when they are affirmed in the future. Therefore, we
have the following similarities:
• FΘM ∼ NθM , if (1 + xM ) ≈
(
1 + MW0
)sM
;
• FΘm ∼ Nθm, if (1 + xm) ≈
(
1 + mW0
)sm
.
Where sM and sm are the senses of truth regarding the receipt
of the values M and m. In this problem, they cannot be time
probabilities since the probabilistic investigation in this case
is not convenient. However, intuitions about the realization of
the hypotheses ΘM and Θm are feasible for individuals and
they should be represented.
Now suppose, without loss of generality, that M is large
enough so that the individual prefers to receive it in the distant
future. If we consider n = ∆t/δt periods in which n attempts
to receive m until M ’s receipt date are allowed, then we have
(1 + xM ) > (1 + xm)
n
⇒
(
1 +
M
W0
)sM
>
(
1 +
m
W0
)nsm
. (4)
Judging by fuzzy logic the two hyprothesis in the future, the
“or” operation between change goals is indicated to finalize
the meiosis procedure,
µ(xM ) = max {µ(xM ), µ ((1 + xm)n − 1)}
= µ
((
1 +
M
W0
)sM
− 1
)
. (5)
In general the time preference solution is presented through
a discount function. In order to use this strategy it is necessary
to develop the same form on both sides of the inequality 4.
For this, there is a value κ such that κsM > m, where we can
write(
1 +
M
W0
)sM
=
(
1 +
κsM
W0
)nsm
>
(
1 +
m
W0
)nsm
. (6)
The discount function undoes exactly the change caused by
the proposition ΘM , that is,
1(
1 + MW0
) = (1 + κsM
W0
)− smsM n
. (7)
Equation 7 describes the hyperbolic discount, the most
well documented empirical observation of discounted utility
[24]. When mathematical functions are explicitly fitted to
experiment data, a hyperbolic shape fits the data better than
the exponential form [42]–[45]. Among the functions proposed
for the adjustment of experimental data, the discount function
proposed by Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter [46]
e−ρnh ≡ (1− hρn)
1
h
allows for greater flexibility of fit for exponential, hyperbolic,
and quasi-hyperbolic discounting [47] (see Figure 4). In order
to obtain it, we must reparametrize equation 7 by doing
1
h
= − sm
sM
n, (8)
ρ =
κsm
W0
. (9)
The parameter h denotes hyperbolicity and it gives the curve
shape over time. For instance, e−ρxh equals the exponential
function e−ρx when h→ 0−. This means that there is plenty
of time for possible trials with higher sense of truth until the
date of the great reward. On the other hand, h 0 indicates
time shortage for trials. In theses cases, only the first periods
have strong declines in the discount function. In short, equation
8 shows that the senses of truth and the time between rewards
determinate the value of h.
Furthermore, the discount rate ρ quantifies the preference
for goods and it is influenced by individual states of scarcity
and abundance of goods. For instance, let us consider an
individual called Bob. If an object is scarce for him (small
W0), then he places a higher preference (great ρ). Analogously,
if W0 represents an abundance state for him, he has a lower
preference (small ρ). This may cause great variability in
experiments because the wealth distribution follows the power
law [48]–[51]. This means that W0 can vary abruptly from
one individual to another in the same intertemporal arbitrage
experiment.
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Fig. 4. Discount function e−ρnh versus number of delayed periods: the dashed
black curve is the exponential discounting for ρ = 0.005; the ◦-blue curve
is quasi-hyperbolic discounting for ρ = 0.7 and h = −3; and the ∗-red and
cyan curves are hyperbolic discounting for ρ1 = 0.0175 and h1 = −3, and
ρ2 = 0.05 and h2 = −5, respectively.
A. Discussion about time preference behaviors
Daniel Read pointed out that a common evidence in time
preference is the “subadditve discounting”, in others words,
the discounting over a delay is greater when it is divided into
subintervals than when it is left undivided [25]. For example,
in [52], [53] it has been argued that abstinent drug addicts may
more readily relapse into addiction if an abstinence period is
presented as a series of shorter periods, rather than a undivided
long period. This property is present in the function e−xh ,
because if h < 0, then
e−xh e
−y
h = e
−x−y+hxy
h < e
−x−y
h for all x, y > 0.
6The hyperbolicity, due to intertemporal arbitrage, is always
negative, 1h = − smsM n. Therefore, we have a subadditivity as a
mandatory property in the time preference for positive awards.
However, the main experimentally observed behavior, here-
inafter referred to as “time effect”, concerns the observation
that the discount rate will vary inversely with the time period
to be waited. Here, we can verify this effect as a consequence
of the subadditivity found in the function e−ρnh . After all, when
we want to find the discount rate through a given discount D
after n periods, then we calculate − 1n lnD. For example, if we
have an exponential discounting e−ρn, then ρ = − 1n ln e−ρn.
Thus, using the subadditive property we can develop(
e−ρh
)n ≤ e−ρnh ⇒ − 1n ln (e−ρh )n ≥ − 1n ln e−ρnh
⇒ 〈− ln e−ρh 〉 ≥ 〈− 1n ln e−ρnh
〉
.
Therefore, if h does not tend to zero from the left side, then
the average discount rate over shorter time is higher than the
average discount rate over longer time horizons. For example,
in [54] it was asked to respondents how much money they
would require to make waiting one month, one year and ten
years just as attractive as getting the $ 250 now. The median
responses (US $ 300, US $ 400 and US $ 1000) had an average
(annual) discount rate of 219% over the one month, 120% over
the one year and 19% over the ten years. Other experiments
presented a similar pattern [19]–[23]. Therefore, the time effect
is a consequence of subadditivity when there is not plenty of
time for trials at one of the hypotheses.
A second behavior, referred to as “magnitude effect”, is
also consequence of subadditivity. The reason for this is that
magnitude effect and time effects are mathematically similar,
because the discount rate is ρ = κsm/W0 and κ is growing for
large values of M (see equation 6). In order to understand the
similarity, note that the function e−ρnh varies with nρ. If we
set the value n, for example n = 1, and we vary the only rate
ρ = rρ0, where ρ0 is constant and r > 1 is a multiplier which
is growing for values of M , then we have the function e−rρ0h
analogous to e−ρnh . Therefore, the magnitude effect made by
r, similarly to the time effect, results in〈− ln e−ρ0h 〉 ≥ 〈−1r ln e−ρ0rh
〉
.
For example, in Thaler’s investigation [54], the respondents
preferred, on average, $ 30 in 3 months rather than $ 15 now,
$ 300 in 3 months rather than $ 250 now, and $ 3500 in 3
months rather than $ 3000 now, where the discount rates are
277%, 73% and 62%, respectively. Other experiments have
found similar results [19], [42], [43], [55]–[62].
Another experimentally observed behavior is the “prefer-
ence reversal”. Initially, when individuals are asked to choose
between one apple today and two apples tomorrow, then they
may be tempted to prefer only one apple today. However, when
the same options are long delayed, for example, choosing
between one apple in one year and two apples in one year plus
one day, then to add one day to receive two apples becomes
acceptable [54].
The preference reversal shows how we evaluate value and
time in the same hypothesis. For example, if M1 < M2,
then, in hypothesis, it is easier “to receive M1 today” than “to
receive M2 today”. In this case, the sense of truth s1 regarding
the receipt of M1 is greater than the sense of truth s2 regarding
the receipt of M2. For purposes of evaluation, consider that
s2 is not small enough to make M1 preferable, that is(
1 +
M1
W0
)s1
<
(
1 +
M2
W0
)s2
. (10)
However, when one has to choose between the hypotheses
“to receive M1 today” and “to receive M2 tomorrow”, then it
should be noted that sequential execution of these actions can
give an advantage to receive M1 in the future. For simplicity,
imagine that the proposal of each hypothesis happens always
after receiving the reward. Then, in this case, the first hypoth-
esis represents the attempt to receive M1 every day, while the
second hypothesis represents the attempt to receive M2 every
other day. If M1 is not much less than M2, then it will be more
advantageous trying to receive M1 twice rather than expecting
two days to receive M2. Therefore, in dynamic situations, the
waiting time between the hypotheses affects the frequency of
attempts, resulting in(
1 +
M1
W0
)2s1
>
(
1 +
M2
W0
)s2
. (11)
On the other hand, when one has to choose between the
hypotheses H1 =“to receive M1 in n days” and H2 = “to
receive M2 in n + 1 days”, then a similar judgment can be
made by evaluating the proposed action execution over and
over again over time. Since the waiting time to receive M1
is shorter, then we can realize that the number of attempts to
receive M1 will be greater in the future ((n + 1)/n trials to
receive M1 for each trial to receive M2). By fuzzy temporal
logic, the choice between H1 and H2 depends on the following
result:
max
{(
1 +
M1
W0
)n+1
n s1
,
(
1 +
M2
W0
)s2}
.
When n = 1, then it will be preferable to receive the reward
M1 (see equation 11). This can also happen to other small
values of n, for example, n equals 2 or 3. However, when n is
large enough, the relation (n+1)/n tends to 1 and makes M2
a preferable reward (see equation 10). Thus, the preference
between the rewards are reversed when they are shifted in
time. In similar experiments, this behavior can be observed in
humans [56], [63]–[65] and in pigeons [66], [67].
Hence, the time effect and magnitude effect on the discount
rates, preference reversal and subadditivity are strong empir-
ical evidences for the application of fuzzy temporal logic in
intertemporal choices.
IV. LOTTERIES
In a more realistic human behavior descriptive analysis with
the psychophysics, the subjective value of lottery must be
related to the wealth change [36]. However, changes after
lotteries have incomplete information because we avoid calcu-
lating them using equity values, premiums and probabilities.
7Therefore, fuzzy sets are good candidates for representing
these hypothetical changes. In addition, more realistic expecta-
tions should consider the evolution of outcomes over time [30].
Thus, the changes may have their expected values attenuated
or intensified by the sense of truth (intuitive time probability).
A. Meiosis and risk aversion
In order to model lotteries consider the hypothesis Θ2 = “to
win M” and a probability p ∈ [0, 1]. If M > 0, then by fuzzy
temporal logic we can have:
• l1 = to win Mp (at the next moment);
• l2 = to win M (at the next moment) with probability p.
The expression “at the next moment” does not appear in the
experiments, but they are implicit because the low waiting
time for the two lotteries seems to be the same. Moreover,
note that both lotteries are equivalents in the ensemble average
(E = pM for the two lotteries).
Again, let us consider an individual called Bob who may
repeat similar lotteries in the future. Therefore, this repetition
can affect his decision [30]. If the lottery l2 is repeated several
times until he wins M , then l2 is similar to affirm
FΘ2 = “will sometime win M”,
where p is the time probability (or sense of truth for lottery).
Thus, if we perform the meiotic argumentation procedure (see
section II-C), then the similar sentence which have equivalent
outcomes to FΘ2 is
Nθ2 = “will win W0
(
1 +
M
W0
)p
−W0 at the next moment”,
in which this sentence is a future affirmation of the hypothesis
θ2 = “to win W0
(
1 +
M
W0
)p
−W0”.
Now, the difference between Nθ2 and Nl1 consists only
in the value of the award. Although values are reported
in lotteries, variations on wealth are unknown because the
cognitive effort to perform the division M/W0 is avoided.
Thus, taking x ≥ 0, such that x = M/W0, we can only
evaluate changes,
Nl1 or Nθ2 = max{µ(px), µ ((1 + x)p − 1)}
= µ(px) for all x ≥ 0. (12)
The line px is tangent to the concave curve (1 + x)p− 1 at
the point x = 0 what results in px ≥ (1 + x)p − 1 for x ≥ 0.
An example can be seen in Figure 5 where the dashed blue
line x/2 is above the curve ◦-blue (1 +x) 12 −1. Analogously,
a similar illustration can be seen for p = 1/10. Thus, we can
note that the lottery l1 is preferable for any values of M and
p, because the line px is always above the curve (1 +x)p−1.
This result is consistent with the respondents’ choices in the
Kahneman and Tversky experiments [35]. Thus, the concave
curve representing the expected positive change at the next
moment can be described by
M+p (x) = (1 + x)p − 1
= p lnp(1 + x) for all x ≥ 0. (13)
The function lnp(x) ≡ (xp − 1)/p is defined here as in [68]
and it is commonly used in nonextensive statistics [69], [70].
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Fig. 5. Function M+p (x) to represent meiosis. The blue dashed line x/2 is
tangent to the ◦-blue curve given by M+
1/2
(x). Analogously, the red dashed
line x/10 is tangent to the ∗-red curve given byM+
1/10
(x). Note that in the
vicinity of zero the curves are close, so this is a region of low distinguishability
for the changes.
B. Hyperbole and risk seeking
Kahneman and Tversky also show that the subjective value
function is not always concave [36]. They noted that in a
loss scenario there is a convexity revealing a preference for
uncertain loss rather than for certain loss. If we replace the
word “win” for “lose” in the lotteries l1 and l2, then we have
the following lotteries that result in the wealth decrease:
• l3 = to lose Mp (at the next moment);
• l4 = to lose M (at the next moment) with probability p.
Now consider the hypothesis Θ4 = “to lose M”. If l4 is
repeated until the individual loses M , then this lottery becomes
similar to
FΘ4 = “will sometime lose M”,
where p is the time probability (sense of truth for FΘ4).
Simultaneously, the lottery l3 proposes a certain loss. Then
we can reduce its sense of truth for p to compare with FΘ4.
For this, let us consider the following hyperbole
L3 = “to lose W0 −W0
(
1− pM
W0
) 1
p
”,
in which the affirmation in the future
FL3 = “will sometime lose W0 −W0
(
1− pMW0
) 1
p
”
arguments an expected change (1+px)
1
p −1 for −1 ≤ x < 0.
The line x is tangent to the convex curve (1 + px)
1
p − 1 at
the point x = 0 for any p, what results in (1 + x)
1
p − 1 ≥ x
for −1 ≤ x < 0. In Figure 6 the dashed black line x
represents the proposed change in l4 and the curves ∗-red
and ◦-blue, belonging to the family of curves (1 + px) 1p − 1,
represent the hyperbolic argumentation for l3. Therefore, note
that the family of curves (1 + px)
1
p − 1 is very close to line
x until 0.1. This means that they have low distinguishability
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Fig. 6. The hyperbolic curves (1 + px)
1
p for p = 1/2 and p = 1/10. Note
that the curves tangentiate the black dashed line x at the point zero. The
interval −0.1 ≤ x < 0 is a region of low distinguishability.
in this region, in other words, uncertain and certain losses
can be imperceptible changes when the losses are small. In
fuzzy logic is equivalent to choose between “small decrease
in wealth with certainty” and “small decrease in wealth with
probability p”. The decreases in wealth are almost the same
and undesirable, but the uncertainty argues hope for escaping
losses and it is desirable. Thus, the uncertain option for losses
will be more attractive in this situation. Then, in order to
simulate risk seeking in the losses region we must insert a
rate ρ into the hyperbolic argumentation process, so that
H−p (ρx) ≡ (1 + pρx)
1
p − 1
= eρxp − 1.
The rate ρ makes the curve H−p (ρx) more convex. Thus, its
first values pass below the line x to simulate the risk seeking.
In Figure 7 the red curve has ρ = 1.2 and p = 1/2 to simulate
this effect in the interval −0.55 < x < 0. The value ρ = 1.2
was exaggerated just to make the risk seeking visible in the
figure, but it should be slightly larger than 1 for a more realistic
representation.
Now we can make a judgment between the sentences FL3
and FΘ4 because the difference between them is only the
argued decrease wealth,
FL3 or FΘ4 = max{µ
(
eρxp − 1
)
, µ(x)} (14)
=
{
µ(x) for small losses,
µ
(
eρxp − 1
)
for big losses.
This means that the lottery l4 is preferable when M represents
small losses, but when the losses are large, then l3 is inter-
preted as the best option. Thus, the risk seeking disappears
when the fuzzy sets are distinguishable.
In order to understand the disappearance of risk seeking,
imagine all the goods necessary for your survival. After
imagining them, then what do you prefer? “to lose 50% of all
assets” or “a chance to lose all assets with probability 0.5”?
If you chose the first option then you understood that a ruin
aversion [37] can be dominant in this context. On this account,
if “all assets” is representing all the means of survival, then the
second option may mean a death anticipation after the lottery,
while the former will allow the continuation of life with half
of all assets.
Finally, the function with expected changes at the next
moment, convex for losses and concave for gains, exhibiting
a S-shape, can be defined by
Sp(x) =
{
p lnp(1 + x) if x ≥ 0,
eρxp − 1 if − 1 < x < 0.
In Figure 7, when p = 1/2 and ρ = 1.2, the function Sp(x)
has risk seeking for −0.55 < x < 0, but has a kind of ruin
aversion for −1 < x < −0.55. The risk aversion is always
present for all x > 0.
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Fig. 7. Function S0.5(x) for ρ = 1.2. When the red curve is below the
dashed black line we have risk seeking (interval −0.55 < x < 0). On the
other hand, we have a kind of ruin aversion when the red line is above the
line x (interval −1 < x < −0.55). The risk aversion behavior is always
present for all x > 0 (dashed black line x/2 above the red curve).
C. Loss aversion and disjunction between hypotheses
The loss aversion principle, Sp(x) < −Sp(−x), refers to
the tendency to avoid losses rather than to acquire equivalent
gains, in other words, it is better not to lose $ 1,000 than to
win $ 1,000.
In order to understand why the curve is steeper on the losses
side, consider that Bob has only $10,000 (all of his money).
If now he loses $ 1,000, then the variation is -10% and his
new wealth is $ 9,000. However, if he wins $ 1,000, then the
positive variation is 10% and his new wealth is $ 11,000. So far
this process seems fair, but we need to look at it dynamically.
If he will have $ 9,000 at the next moment, then he will need
to gain 11.11% to get back $ 10,000. On the other hand, if
he will have $ 11,000 at the next moment, then the required
variation is -9.09% to get back $ 10,000. So which is the most
difficult change to happen? Exactly, the 11.11% that restore
the previous state after to lose 10%. Therefore, it is better not
lose 10% than to gain 10% in the long-term gamble.
9This behavior can be modeled in fuzzy temporal logic
through the disjunction operator. In order to understand the
details about the disjunction between loss and gain hypotheses,
consider the lottery
Lwl = “to win M1 with probability p
or to lose M2 with probability q”.
If winning M1 produces a gain x1 > 0 and losing M2
produces a loss, −1 ≤ x2 < 0, so we have the following
atomic hypotheses
H1 = “to win M1” and H2 = “to lose M2”.
Where the sense of truth for H1 is p and the sense of truth
for H2 is q. The future statement for disjunction is
F (H1 ∨H2) = “to win M1 or to lose M2
once in the future”.
The change average in this disjunction is (1 + x1)p(1 + x2)q
for p + q < 1. This means that one of the hypotheses may
be true at the next instant, or none, because only one will
sometime be true in the future.
Another way of affirming a disjunction of losses and gains
is ensuring that one or the other will be true at the next
instant, N(H1 ∨ H2). The change average in this case is
(1 + x1)
p(1 + x2)
q for p + q = 1. This means that H1 or
H2 will be true at the next moment with absolute certainty.
Uncertainty is just “which hypothesis is true?”. Therefore, the
judgment preceding the decision whether or not participating
in this lottery, N(H1 ∨H2) or nothing, is equal to
max{µ ((1 + x1)p(1 + x2)q − 1) , µ(0)}.
The lottery Lwl, which is a loss and gain disjunction, will be
considered fair if the parameters x1, x2, p and q guarantee
(1 + x1)
p(1 + x2)
q − 1 > 0. In the experiment described
at [35], the value p = 1/2 and x1 = x2 = x generate the
inequality
√
1− x2 − 1 < 0 that makes the lottery unfair.
Thus, the respondent’s choice for not betting seems to reveal
a perception about the lottery dynamics. In addition, it can be
noted that expected negative change has its intensity increased
by x. Therefore, the intensity of loss aversion is amount
magnitude dependent. This means that the feeling of aversion
to the lottery increases with the growth of the amount. In [41]
is presented an empirical evidence of this behavior.
V. CONCLUSION
Heuristics are cognitive processes that ignore part of the
information and use simple rules to make a decision quicker
and easier. In general, they are defined as strategies that seek
alternatives, stop searches in a short time, and make a decision
soon after.
Within heuristic processes, some decision-making requires
the hypotheses judgment about dynamic processes before they
take place in time. Time Preference Problem and Prospect
Theory are famous examples. The first evaluates the goods
receipt at different future dates and the second requires lotter-
ies valuation before their outcomes are known. The common
characteristics between these two problems noted here are the
magnitude dependence and the inseparability between time
and uncertainty. On the magnitude dependence it can be
concluded that:
• the magnitude effect in time preference is a consequence
of subadditivity;
• the risk seeking can disappear in the Prospect Theory if
high magnitude losses were considered. In addition, the
aversion risk increases with the growth of the amounts.
On the other hand, on the inseparability between time and
uncertainty it can be concluded that:
• in the time preference problem, the number of uncertain
trials for the short-term hypotheses until verification of
the long-term hypothesis produces the subadditive dis-
counting, and consequently, higher annual average rates
as the waiting time decreases. In addition, the preference
reversal occurs because the number of allowed trials is
changed when the hypothesis deadlines are shifted in
time;
• the probabilities of lotteries represent the temporal inde-
terminism about the future. Thus, the S-shaped curve in
the Prospect Theory can be described by expected fuzzy
changes of temporal hyptotheses.
If the future is uncertain, then time and uncertainty about
changes can not mean two independent matters. For this
reason, choice under uncertainty and intertemporal choice,
traditionally treated as separate subjects, are unified in a same
matter in this paper to elaborate the rhetoric for the decision-
making.
In addition, it is shown that the fuzziness can changes to
prospective judgments about magnitude dependent gains and
losses. This means that a given problem may have different
decisions simply by changing the values of the rewards, even
if time and uncertainty context are not changed. Exactly in
these situations, fuzzy environment modeling will be essential
to represent the decision-making.
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